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Reporting Behind a Shield:
The Growth of Missouri's Fair Report
Privilege to Defame
Kenney v. Scripps Howard BroadcastingCo.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of defamation has evolved along a curious path. It is caught in the
middle of a legal tug-of-war between the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
First Amendment and each state's interest in allowing its citizens to protect their
reputations from being dragged through the mud. The Supreme Court of the
United States and the State of Missouri continue their efforts to strike a proper
balance between these interests by tinkering with the elements required for a
defamation claim and by creating privileges that prevent defamation liability.
One of Missouri's attempts to strike this proper balance is found in its
adoption of the fair report privilege. This privilege prevents defamation liability
based on a defamatory statement that fairly and accurately reports information
taken from official actions or proceedings. In Kenney v. Scripps Howard
BroadcastingCo.,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that Missouri's fair report privilege protected a television station from
defamation liability for its news report that a grandmother was suspected of
kidnaping her granddaughter This Note evaluates why the court reached this
decision, why applying the fair report privilege was erroneous and unnecessary,
and the potential dangers of the court's holding.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On August 30, 1996, Carolyn Kenney picked up her sixteen-month-old
granddaughter, Lauren Kenney, from the home of Lauren's mother, Angela
Miles.4 At the time Carolyn picked up the child, Angela was not married to
Lauren's father, who was Carolyn's son, Chris Kenney, and Chris and Angela
did not have any agreement concerning the custody of Lauren.5 Over the next
two days, neither Carolyn nor Chris returned Lauren to Angela.6

1. 259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. id.
3. See id. at 923-24.
4. Kenney v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., No. 98-1079-CV-W-BD, 2000 WL
33173915, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 28, 2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001).
5. Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923. Although neither parent had sought custody of Lauren
at this time, a custody hearing was scheduled for the following Tuesday. Id.
6. Id.
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On September 1, 1996, Angela reported to the Kansas City Police
Department that Lauren was missing or had been kidnaped.' In doing this,
Angela met with a police officer to explain the circumstances surrounding
Lauren's disappearance. 8 As a result of this meeting, the police officer filed an
investigative report which stated that Carolyn was the last person Angela had
seen with Lauren and that, after the child was taken, Chris had told Angela that
Lauren was with him, but he would not say where he was located.9
After the officer filed the investigative report, a detective with the Kansas
City Police Department filed a missing person report classifying Lauren as "a
missing juvenile who was reported to have been kidnaped by a parent or other
relative."'" The missing person report also stated that Carolyn was the last
person Angela had seen with Lauren." In addition to filing the missing person
report, the detective called Carolyn's home and asked Carolyn's husband, Tom
Kenney, if he knew where Lauren was located.' 2 Tom told the detective that
Lauren was with Carolyn and Chris. 3 Based on this information, the missing
person report also stated that Tom had informed the detective that Lauren was
with Chris. 4 Finally, on the same day the detective filed the missing person
report, the detective filed a pick-up order that ordered law enforcement officers
to take Lauren into custody if she was located.' 5
On the same day Angela reported Lauren as missing, and the same day the
police reports were filed, Angela contacted Scripps Howard Broadcasting
Company's Kansas City television affiliate, KSHB-channel 41 ("KSHB") about
her situation. 6 Angela told KSHB that Lauren was missing and provided them
with copies of the police reports. 7 From this information, KSHB reported the
following story on the following night's ten o'clock news:

7. Kenney,2000 WL 33173915, at *2.
8. Id.
9.Kenney,259 F.3d at 923.
10. Kenney, 2000 WL 33173915, at *2.
11. Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.
12. Kenney, 2000 WL 33173915, at *6.
13. Id.
14. Id. Although the missing person report stated that Tom told the detective that
Lauren was with Chris, there is no suggestion inthe facts stated in the district or appellate
court's opinion that the missing person report stated that Tom told the detective Lauren
was with Carolyn. See Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Carolyn disputes what reports Angela gave to KSHB, but the trial court
found that there was no reason to doubt that Angela had provided the station with all of
the necessary reports. See Kenney, 2000 WL 33173915, at *2.
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Police are on the lookout for a missing girl who may have been
abducted by a relative. Sixteen-month-old Lauren Kenney is pictured
here with her mother. The child was last seen Friday afternoon when
she left her house with her paternal grandmother, Carolyn Kenney.
Family members believe the girl's father and grandmother are now
with her at an unknown location.18
During the report, the station displayed a picture of Lauren and Angela, as well
as a picture of Carolyn. 9 The report concluded with a request that anyone with
information call the Kansas City Police Department.2"
Based on this news report, Carolyn brought a defamation action against
Scripps Howard Broadcasting Company ("Scripps Howard"), claiming that the
report falsely accused her of kidnaping Lauren.2 Scripps Howard responded by
filing a motion for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.22 In its motion, Scripps Howard argued three
points.23 First, they claimed that the news report was true, and because of this,
Carolyn could not prove the element of falsity required for a defamation claim.24
Second, Scripps Howard argued that because the news report was a "fair and
accurate account" of the police records, the television station was entitled to the
fair report privilege and could not be liable for the report they had made.2"
Finally, Scripps Howard claimed that Carolyn had no evidence to support a claim
for actual damages.26
Carolyn opposed the summaryjudgment motion with four arguments of her
own.27 First, Carolyn argued that the news report, taken in its context, was not
substantially true and, therefore, it was defamatory.28 Next, Carolyn claimed that
the fair report privilege should not be applied in this case, and, furthermore, even
if it were applied, the privilege should not shield Scripps Howard from liability
because the news report was not an accurate representation of the police

18. Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.
19. Kenney, 2000 WL 33173915, at *1.
20. Id.
21. Id.at *3. Carolyn brought the suit despite her admittance that she did not
suffer any damage to her professional reputation or lose any income as a result of the
report. Id.
22. Id. at * 1. The case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri, but Scripps Howard removed the case to the District Court. Id. at * I n. 1.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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records.29 Finally, Carolyn contended that her claim for emotional distress was
sufficient to support a claim for actual damages.3"
After considering the arguments of both parties, the district court granted
summaryjudgment in favor of Scripps Howard.3 The court agreed with Scripps
Howard that all of the "critical facts in the news broadcast were substantially
true," and, because of this, Carolyn failed to make an actionable claim of
defamation.32 Furthermore, the court found that, even if the report was not
substantially true, it was a "fair and accurate" account of the police reports, and,
therefore, Scripps Howard was entitled to the protection of the fair report
privilege.33
Carolyn appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.34 In ruling on Carolyn's appeal, the court of
appeals only considered the issues relating to the fair report privilege.3 5 The
court began its analysis by acknowledging that Missouri courts have adopted the
fair report privilege as a qualified privilege for a defamatory publication.36 The
court then noted that the privilege only applied if a publication was a fair or
accurate report of an "official action or proceeding.., that deals with a matter
of public concern." 37
Turning to the facts of the present case, the court pointed out that, under
Missouri law, police reports are "reports of an official action subject to the fair
report privilege," and that the "welfare and possible abduction of a child is a
matter of public interest."" With these issues settled, the court addressed
whether Scripps Howard's news report was a "fair and accurate report" of the
Kansas City Police Department's documents. 9 Taking the information
contained in the police reports as a whole and comparing it to the information
contained in the news report, the court found that the news report was "at least
a fair abridgment of the information" found in the police documents.4" From this
conclusion, the court held that because the welfare of a child is a matter of public
concern, and because police reports are subject to the fair report privilege, and
because the news report was "at least a fair abridgment" of the police reports,

29. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Kenney v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 259 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2001).
Kenney, 2000 WL 33173915, at *4.
Id. at *7.
Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 924 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 611 (1976)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Scripps Howard's news report was shielded by the fair report privilege." The
court, therefore, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Scripps Howard.42

HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Policy of a Defamation Action
Two competing policy interests are at the core of all defamation law. First,
the foundation for any defamation action is each state's interest in compensating
its citizens for harm inflicted by a defamatory statement.43 Each person's right
to protect her own reputation "reflects no more than our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being," and the responsibility of
providing a way for each individual to protect her "essential dignity and worth"
is left to the states." The manner in which a state exercises this responsibility,
however, is sharply limited by the First Amendment. The First Amendment
guarantees that expression and debate on public issues "should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open."4'5 The Supreme Court has ensured the power of this
guarantee by creating specific standards that must be met for a person to be held
liable for a defamatory statement.4 6 Through the creation of these standards, the
Court has created a "constitutional bias toward unfettered speech" that often
overrides an individual's right to be compensated for harm caused by a
defamatory statement. 7 Still, even with this constitutional bias, as long as a state
provides defamation liability in accordance with the First Amendment
limitations, the state may allow its citizens to protect their reputations from

41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); Anton v. St. Louis
Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 493,498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). A defamatory
statement is a statement that harms a person's reputation "so as to lower him in the

estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him." Pape
v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376,380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498.
(Stewart, J.,
45. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Anton, 598 S.W.2d at
498.

46. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448,457 (1976); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1975); Gertz,
418 U.S. at 342; N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
47. Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498.
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defamatory statements.4" This tension between the state interest in protecting
individual reputations and the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech has
created the web of elements, privileges, and defenses that make up defamation
law in Missouri.
B. Defamation Law in Missouri
Under Missouri law, to succeed in a defamation action, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant (1) published (2) a defamatory statement (3) of and
conceming the plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with the requisite
degree of fault, and (6) that damages the plaintiffs reputation. 9 As a general
rule, a jury decides whether these elements are satisfied based on the specific
facts of each case."° If an allegedly defamatory statement, on its face, is not
capable of satisfying one of the required elements, however, a court may rule that
the statement is not defamatory as a matter of law."'
A statement satisfies the "publication" requirement if it is communicated to
someone other than the person allegedly defamed. 2 The element does not
require that the communication be the first time the statement was made. 3 Every
time a statement is repeated it is a "publication" in itself, and every person who
plays any role in communicating the statement to a third person is considered to
have published the statement.5 4
Satisfying the "defamatory statement" element is not quite as simple. Under
Missouri law, a statement is defamatory if it harms a person's reputation so as
to "lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating with him."55 Statements often fit this definition if they "tend to

48. Id.
49. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 1 S.W.3d 62,70 (Mo. 2000); see Englezos
v. Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); MISSOURI
APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 23.06(1) (6th ed. 2002); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 613 (1976).

50. Spradlin's Mkt., Inc. v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 859, 865
(Mo. 1966); Coots v. Payton, 280 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Mo. 1955).
51. See Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); see also Klein
v. Victor, 903 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Spradlin'sMt., Inc., 398 S.W.2d
at 865; Coots, 280 S.W.2d at 51.
52. Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. 1993); Dvorak v.
O'Flynn, 808 S.W.2d 912,916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 797 (5th ed. 1984).
53. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 799.
54. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 13, at 799.
55. Pape,918 S.W.2d at 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Henry v. Halliburton,
690 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. 1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1976)); see Coots, 280 S.W.2d at 53; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 111, at 774.
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expose another to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. '56 A statement is not
defamatory, however, simply because it exposes a person to ridicule in the form
of "jests or injured personal feelings. 57 The statement must also have the
tendency to negatively affect the person's association with others or negatively
affect the person's standing in the community."8
Whether a statement is capable of satisfying the "defamatory statement"
element is a question of law for a court to decide. 59 In making this
determination, a court must consider an allegedly defamatory statement in
connection with the entire "publication" in which the statement was made. 60 In
doing so, the court must give the words of the publication, and especially the
words of the allegedly defamatory statement contained in the publication, their
"plain and ordinarily understood meaning." 6' The court does this by interpreting
the words as they would normally be understood by the people to whom they
were addressed in the circumstances in which they were communicated.62
In addition to proving that a statement is defamatory, a plaintiff in a
defamation action must also show that the defamatory statement refers to her in
some way.63 This is known as the "of and concerning element. '64 To satisfy this
element, a plaintiff is not required to prove that the person who made the
statement intended to refer to the plaintiff.65 Rather, a plaintiff only needs to
show that a recipient of the statement reasonably believed that the statement
referred to the plaintiff.66 If a statement unambiguously refers to the plaintiff, a

56. Coots, 280 S.W.2d at 53.
57. Id. at 54.
58. See Klein v. Victor, 903 F.Supp. 1327,1335 (E.D. Mo. 1995); KEETON

ETAL.,

supra note 52, § I 11, at 773.
59. Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1330; Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo.
1969); Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 379; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (1976);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § I 1, at 774, 781. If a court finds that a statement is
capable of having a defamatory meaning, the jury then has the responsibility of
determining whether the statement was actually understood as having such a meaning.
See Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1330; Pape,918 S.W.2d at 379; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 614 (1976); KEETON ET AL.,supra note 52, § 111, at 781.
60. Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1330; Duggan v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 913 S.W.2d 807,
810 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d
493, 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 111, at 781-82.
61. Duggan, 913 S.W.2d at 810; see Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1335; Brown, 443

S.W.2d at 150 (referring to the concept as the "natural meaning").
62. Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 497.
63. Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1334; Pape,918 S.W.2d at 380; Duggan, 913 S.W.2d
at 811; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 111, at 783.
64. See Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1334; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 111, at 783.
65. Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1976).
66. Davis, 191 F.2d at 904; Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1334; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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court may find that this element is satisfied as a matter of law, but if there is any
question about whether the statement refers to the plaintiff, the jury decides
whether this element is satisfied.67
The fourth element that a plaintiff in a defamation action must prove is the
falsity element.68 To satisfy this element, a plaintiff must show that the allegedly
defamatory statement is a "false statement of fact. ' 69 This standard has two
discrete, yet interrelated, requirements. First, a plaintiff must prove that the
statement is one of fact, rather than opinion." The reason for this is that the
"First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech makes expressions of
opinions absolutely privileged" against defamation liability.7 The rationale
behind this privilege is that opinions, unlike statements of fact, are not capable
of being proven true or false, and due to this distinction, false statements offact
have little or no social value, while opinions are arguable and advance the First
Amendment's goal of creating "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate."72
Opinions, therefore, are socially valuable, and, because of this, a person who
states an opinion is absolutely protected from defamation liability for doing so."
Whether an allegedly defamatory statement is an opinion or a statement of
fact is a question of law for a court to decide.74 This determination is not
dependent on whether the person who made the statement labels the statement
as his or her opinion.75 Rather, the crucial distinction between a statement of fact

OF TORTS § 564 (1976); see KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 11, at 783.
67. Davis, 191 F.2d at 904; Klein, 903 F. Supp. at 1334.

68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69. Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 493,498 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 116, at 839. It is unclear whether this kind of showing
is required to satisfy the falsity requirement in every defamation action, but it is certain
that, when a defamation defendant is a member of the media, a plaintiff must show that
an allegedly defamatory statement was a "false statement of fact." Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 776-77; Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498.
70. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1990); Pape v.
Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498-99.
71. Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 314 (Mo. 1993); see Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 18-20; Pape,918 S.W.2d at 380; Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498; see also Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
72. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40; Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498.
73. See Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314; Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 498.
74. Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314; Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 379; Diez v. Pearson, 834
S.W.2d 250, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Anton, 598 S.W.2d at 499. Once a court
determines that an allegedly defamatory statement is a statement of fact, thejury has the
task of determining whether it was actually understood by the recipients as being a
statement of fact. Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 379; Diez, 834 S.W.2d at 252.
75. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19; Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 314. Simply couching a
statement in terms of"It is my opinion" or "Ibelieve" does not necessarily mean that the
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and opinion is that a statement of fact contains some element that is "provable
as false." 76 To decide whether a statement contains an element that is "provable
as false," a court looks to the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the
statement to determine whether, at the time the statement was made, an ordinary
person receiving the statement would have believed that the statement contained
information that was capable of being true or false." If not, the statement is an
opinion, and the person who made the statement cannot be liable for defamation
as a result of making the statement. 8
The second requirement a plaintiff in a defamation action must satisfy to
prove that an allegedly defamatory statement was a "false statement of fact," is
to show that the statement of fact was, in fact, false. 79 To meet this requirement,
a plaintiff has to do more than show that the statement was not literally true in
every aspect.8" A plaintiff must show that the statement was not "substantially
true." A statement is considered "substantially true" if the "gist" or "sting" of
the allegedly defamatory statement was true.82 In other words, a statement is not
considered false unless the fact contained in the statement that makes the
statement defamatory is not true.83

The fifth element a plaintiff in a defamation action must prove is that the
statement was published with the degree of fault required by the First

statement is an opinion as defined for defamation law. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
76. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19; Klein v. Victor, 903 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (E.D.
Mo. 1995); Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 381.
77. Diez, 834 S.W.2d at 252; see Pape,918 S.W.2d at 381-82; Anton, 598 S.W.2d
at 499.
78. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-20; Pape, 918 S.W.2d at 380-82; Anton, 598
S.W.2d at 498-99.
79. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,776-77 (1986); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 52, § 116, at 839. It was once the common view that a defendant in
a defamation action had the burden of proving the truth of an allegedly defamatory
statement as an affirmative defense. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 48990 (1975); Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 258 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Mo. 1953); Turnbull
v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). Indeed, some courts still refer
to truth as a defense to a defamatory action. See Love v. Commerce Bank of St. Louis,
37 F.3d 1295, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994). The prevailing modem view, however, is that, due
to the Supreme Court's requirement that a plaintiff prove some level of fault in a
defamation action, a defamation plaintiff now has the burden of proving the falsity of an
allegedly defamatory statement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. j (1976);

KEETON ET AL., supranote 52, § I l, at 783. The Supreme Court has explicitly given the
plaintiff this burden when a "plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for
speech of public concern." PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 777.
80. Turnbull, 459 S.W.2d at 519; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 116, at 842.
81. Turnbull, 459 S.W.2d at 519.
82. Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 116, at 842.
83. Turnbull, 459 S.W.2d at 519.
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Amendment and state law. 4 The reason some level of fault must be shown is
because the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the press was
not adequately protected under the traditional common law approach that
allowed for defamation liability without a showing of any fault in the making of
a defamatory statement.85 To give real meaning to the First Amendment's
guarantee of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate, every person must be
free to make some "mistakes" as to the truth of their statements without fear of
defamation liability for doing so.86 In recognition of this, the Supreme Court,
along with subsequent state courts, has provided specific level of fault
must prove to hold a defendant liable for a
requirements that a plaintiff
87
defamatory statement.
The level of fault a plaintiff must show to hold a defendant liable for a
defamatory statement depends on whether the plaintiff is a private or public
figure.88 So, the first question that must be addressed to determine whether a
plaintiff has satisfied the "level of fault" requirement is whether the plaintiff is
a public figure. There are two ways in which a plaintiff may be considered to be
a public figure. 9 First, in rare circumstances, a person may "achieve such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and
in all contexts."9 More commonly, however, a person is a public figure because
he "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues."91

84. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., I I S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000); MISSOURI
APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 23.06(1) (6th ed. 2002); see Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-52 (1974).
85. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 805; see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-52;

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
86. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269-72; KEETON ETAL.,
supra note 52, § 113, at 804.
87. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; see KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 804-05.
88. Gertz, 418 U.S. 342-49; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 805. There
are several reasons for this distinction. First, a public figure usually has greater access
to the means needed to counteract defamatory speech. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. Also, in
becoming a public figure, it is arguable that a person "assumes the risk" of being a target
of defamation, and because of this, it should be more difficult for a public figure to
recover when she is subjected to the risk she assumed. Id. at 344-45. Finally, statements
made regarding a public figure are more likely to relate to a matter of importance to
society as a whole, and, thus, the statements are more highly valued under the First
Amendment. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 805.

89. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351; KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 806.
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351; see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,453 (1976);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 806.
91. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351; see Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 453; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 52, § 113, at 806.
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If a plaintiff is a public figure in either sense, she may only satisfy the "level
of fault" element of a defamation action if she proves that the allegedly
defamatory statement was made with "actual malice."92

To prove "actual

malice" a plaintiff must show, with clear and convincing evidence, that the
defendant made the statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."93

A plaintiff who is not a public figure is required to make a much lesser
showing of fault to satisfy the "level of fault" element. The Supreme Court
allows the states to define the specific level of fault that must be shown by a
plaintiff who is a private figure, but, at a minimum, the states must require that
a private plaintiff show that the defendant had some level of fault in making the
allegedly defamatory statement.94 Under the law of Missouri, a plaintiff who is
a private figure must show that the defamatory statement was made with
negligence as to the truth of the statement. 9
The final element that a plaintiff in a defamation action must prove under
Missouri law is that the defamatory statement caused harm to her reputation.96
The Supreme Court has provided some leeway for states to find a defendant
liable for defamation even without a showing that a plaintiffs reputation was
actually damaged. 97 The Court has held that the states may base defamation
liability on injuries as vague as "personal humiliation" and "mental anguish and
suffering," 99 Missouri, however, has declined this invitation, and Missouri law
still requires that a plaintiff show actual injury to her reputation to state a prima
facie case for defamation. 99

92. N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Englezos v.
Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
93. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80; see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30 (1984); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Overcast v.
Billings Mut. Ins. Co., II S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000).
94. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; Hoeflicker v. Higginsville Advance, Inc., 818 S.W.2d
650, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
95. Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70. To recover punitive damages, a private plaintiff
must show that the statement was made with "actual malice" as defined for the level of
fault requirement for public figures. Id.; Williams v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 706 S.W.2d
508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
96. MISSOURI APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 23.06(1) (6th ed. 2002);
Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70.
97. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976); see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 52, § I 16A, at 844.
98. Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 460.
99. Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. 1993); MISSOURI
APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 23.06(1) (6th ed. 2002). Missouri law does allow a
plaintiff to recover for harm such as mental anguish after she has proven the elements
required to state a prima facie case of defamation. Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 316.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 14
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

C. The FairReport Privilege
Even if a plaintiff has proven all of the elements necessary to state a claim
for defamation, a defendant may still escape liability if he can show that a
privilege applies to his situation.'
There are several specific categories of
privileges, but as a general rule, a privilege applies to prevent liability for
defamation where circumstances exist, or are reasonably believed to exist by the
person making a statement, such that the person making the statement has an
interest that gives him a "duty to communicate the alleged defamatory matter to
another person or persons having a corresponding interest or duty."' 0 ' Whether
a privilege exists in each specific case is a matter of law for a court to decide." 2
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a special privilege known as
the "fair report privilege."'0 3 The Restatement states the privilege as follows:
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report
of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public
that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is
accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence
reported." 4
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri officially
adopted this privilege in the exact language as it is provided in the
Restatement, 10 5 and, since then, Missouri courts have consistently reaffirmed the
viability of this privilege as part of Missouri's defamation law."06
The fair report privilege is based on the "interest of the public in having
information made available to it as to what occurs in official proceedings and

100. See Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 115, at 824-25.
101. Turnbull, 459 S.W.2d at 520. A discussion of all the myriad of specific
privileges that have been recognized by courts is beyond the scope of this Note, but for
a delightful summary see KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 115, at 824-32.
102. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 72 (Mo. 2000).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1976).

104. Id.
105. Shafer v. Lamar Publ'g Co., Inc., 621 S.W.2d 709, 711-13 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
106. See Klein v. Victor, 903 F. Supp. 1327, 1336 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Englezos v.
Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Hoeflicker v.
Higginsville Advance, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Erickson v.
Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 797 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Williams v. Pulitzer
Broad. Co., 706 S.W.2d 508, 510-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Lami v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co.,
723 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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public meetings."' 7 The basic idea is that providing the privilege will spur
"freedom of discussion" and, at the same time, encourage the government to "be
responsive to the will of the people" by making its official actions more readily
known to the public. 8 Also, because the privilege is limited to official
proceedings or meetings open to the public, a report of such merely makes
members of the public aware of information they would have known had they
attended the meeting or had they taken any other action to know information they
already had a right to know."0 9
In each defamation case, the defendant has the burden of proving that,
under the facts of the case, the fair report privilege applies to him, and whether
the defendant has satisfied this burden is a matter of law for the court to
decide."' To meet his burden of proving that the fair report privilege should be
applied to protect him from liability, a defamation defendant must prove that (1)
the information he reported was taken from an "official act or proceeding" or a
meeting open to the public, (2) the information he reported was a "matter of
public concern," and that (3) his report was a "fair and accurate" account of the
official act or proceeding."'
As just stated, the fair report privilege extends only to protect reports of"an
official action or proceeding or a meeting open to the public.""' 2 For the
purposes of the privilege, an "official act or proceeding" includes "any action
taken by any officer or agency of the government of the United States, or of any
State or of any of its subdivisions." ' 3 Included in this definition is any action
taken by "organizations that are by law authorized to perform public duties." ' 4
Missouri courts have often found that action taken by the police, and reports
filed by the police, are "official actions" as required for the application of the fair
report privilege." 5 Indeed, this is supported in some part by the explicit

107. Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 711-12 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS §
611 cmt. a (1976)); see also Butler v. Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 116, 119
(Ark. 2001); KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 115, at 836.

108. Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 713.
109. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 140-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 826 (1981); Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321,331 (Minn.
2000); KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 115, at 836.

110. Hoeflicker, 818 S.W.2d at 652; Erickson, 797 S.W.2d at 857; Williams, 706
S.W.2d at 511.
111. See Englezos, 980 S.W.2d at 32; Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 711-13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1976).

112. Englezos, 980 S.W.2d at 32.
113. Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 712 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611

cmt. d (1976)).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. d (1976).
115. See Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 258 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Mo. 1953) (reports
of actions taken by police are privileged); Biermann v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 627 S.W.2d
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language of the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 611, which
provides that "[a]n arrest by an officer is an official action.""' 6 Not all police
action, however, is considered "official action" under the Restatement's
recitation of the fair report privilege. The comments to the Restatement note that
"statements made by the police ... as to the facts of the case.., are not yet part
of. . . the arrest itself," and, therefore, reports on such statements are not
privileged. 7 No Missouri court has addressed this limiting language, and based
on Missouri's continued application of the privilege to a wide range of police
activity, both before Missouri's official adoption of the Restatement's version of
the fair report privilege and after, it is questionable whether a Missouri court
would give effect to the limiting language contained in the Restatement." 18
There is also no clear consensus in the courts of other jurisdictions
concerning the effect, if any, of the Restatement's language that limits what
police action should be considered "official action." Some courts have, while
generally adopting the fair report privilege as stated in the Restatement, explicitly
rejected the Restatement's limiting language.'"' Other courts have simply
recognized that whether the Restatement's limiting language is the law of their
state is an open question and then relied on other grounds to make their decision
20
in the case before them.
Assuming he has satisfied the "official action" requirement, the second
circumstance that a defendant must prove to gain the protection of the fair report
privilege is that the report contained a "matter of public concern."'' Neither the
comments to the Restatement nor Missouri case law provides any insight into
what is required to show that a report contains a matter of public concern. 2'

87, 88-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (privilege to report on information contained in police
files); Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516, 520-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (reports
concerning actions taken by police and the police statements regarding the reason for
arrest were privileged). Although two of these cases were decided prior to the explicit
adoption of the fair report privilege as stated in the Restatement, the cases are relevant
because they applied the common law equivalent to the fair report privilege that existed
in Missouri prior to Shafer v. Lamar Publ'g Co., Inc., 621 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. h (1976).
117. Id.
118. See Moritz, 258 S.W.2d at 585; Biermann, 627 S.W.2d at 88-89; Turnbull,
459 S.W.2d at 520-21.
119. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 139-40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 836 (1981) (reports based on information in FBI reports not explicitly a part of an
arrest were within the scope of the fair report privilege).
120. See KARK-TV v. Simon, 656 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Ark. 1983) (relying on
inaccuracy of the report to find that the privilege did not apply).
121. Englezos v. Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 32 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1976).
122. The most relevant statement is contained in an opinion by the United States
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This is most likely due to the fact that, because the fair report privilege is limited
to reports of official acts or proceedings or meetings open to the public, it is
assumed that every report that fits the "official action" requirement will
necessarily be about a "matter of public concern."
The final, and most important, requirement that must be shown for a
defendant to be protected by the fair report privilege is that the report is a "fair
and accurate" account of an official act or proceeding.' 23 To satisfy this
requirement under Missouri law, it is not necessary that a defendant prove that
the report was an exact replication of the official act or proceeding.' 24 Rather,
a defendant satisfies the "fair and accurate" requirement if he can show that the
report provided the people who received it with a "substantially correct" account
of the official act or proceeding.2 5 Still, if a defendant takes it upon himself to
add to the report something that was not contained in the official act or
proceeding or if he produces the report to the audience in such a way as to create
an unfair or erroneous impression, his report is not considered "fair and
accurate," and the report is not protected by the fair report privilege. 6
Two previous cases provide good examples of when the "fair and accurate"
requirement is, and is not, satisfied. First, in Shafer v. Lamar PublishingCo.,' 27
the Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri found that a newspaper
report was a "fair and accurate" account of events that took place at a city

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which stated that "child abuse ... is
a matter of public concern." Klein v. Victor, 903 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
The reasoning for this statement, however, was not explained, and the court's statement
was not related to the fair report privilege. See id. As a result, the value of this
statement, as it relates to the "public concern" requirement of the fair report privilege,
appears to be minimal at best.
123. Moritz, 258 S.W.2d at 585; Duggan v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 913 S.W.2d 807,
811 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Erickson v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 797 S.W.2d 853,857 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); Williams v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 706 S.W.2d 508, 510-11 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Shafer v. Lamar Publ'g Co., 621 S.W.2d 709,712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Turnbull,
459 S.W.2d at 520; see also Spradlin's Mkt., Inc. v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 398
S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. 1966); Hoeflicker v. Higginsville Advance, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 650,
651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1976); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 52, § 115, at 837.
124. Hoeflicker, 818 S.W.2d at 652; Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 712; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. f (1976); KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 115, at 838.
125. Hoeflicker, 818 S.W.2d at 652; Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 712; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. f (1976); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 115,
at 838.
126. Shafer, 621 S.W.2d at 712; Turnbull, 459 S.W.2d at 520-21; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. f (1976); see also Spradlin 's Mkt., Inc., 398 S.W.2d at
864; Moritz, 258 S.W.2d at 586.
127. 621 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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council meeting. 2 In Shafer, the report in question stated that some participants

in a city council meeting had accused a police officer of "knocking up" his
sixteen-year-old daughter.' 29 In holding that this report was a fair and accurate
account of the meeting, the court noted that such an accusation had actually been
made at the meeting and that, even though the newspaper had no proof of
whether the accusation was valid or not, the newspaper report simply stated that

the accusation had been made. 3

The report, therefore, was "fair and

3

accurate."' '
At the other end of the spectrum is the report complained about in
Hoeflicker v. HigginsvilleAdvance, Inc. 32
' In Hoeflicker, the Court of Appeals
for the Western District of Missouri found that a newspaper report which
inaccurately listed the plaintiff as a defendant in a wrongful death lawsuit was
not a "fair and accurate" account of court proceedings.' 33 The court reached this
decision despite the fact that the newspaper had based its report on a file docket
maintained by the city clerk which did erroneously list the plaintiff as a
defendant to a wrongful death suit. ' Nevertheless, the court found that, because
the report described the specific allegations in the suit, it went beyond simply
describing the contents of the file docket, and, therefore, the report could only
be protected by the fair report privilege if the report was a fair and accurate
account of the suit, and not the file docket.' 35 Because the plaintiff was not
actually a defendant in a wrongful death action, the court found that the report
added facts beyond the official proceeding on which it was reporting, and
because of this, the report was not a fair and accurate account of the lawsuit.'36
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Kenney v. Scripps HowardBroadcastingCo., 37 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied Missouri law to determine whether the
fair report privilege protected a television station from defamation liability for
reporting in an evening newscast that the plaintiff was suspected of kidnaping
her granddaughter. 3 '

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.at 714.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 714.
818 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
Id.at 652.
Id. at 651.
Id.at 652.
Id.
259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id.at 923. Even though the court below had also ruled on the merits of
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The court began its analysis by stating that, under Missouri law, "reports of
legislative, judicial or executive proceedings" are subject to a qualified
privilege.' 39 Furthermore, the court stated that Missouri has officially adopted
the fair report privilege as it was set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 611 (1976), which provides:
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report
of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public
that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is
accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrences
reported. 4 °
Interpreting the language of this section of the Restatement, and using prior
Missouri cases that had already done so as a guide, the court specified that the
fair report privilege only applied to "matters of public concern" that are "stated
in a report of an official action or proceeding or meeting open to the public."''
The court also specified that the privilege "can only be overcome if the matters
published were not a fair and accurate report" of the proceeding.' 42
The court then turned to the facts of the present case to determine whether
the fair report privilege applied to protect the television station from defamation
liability. 43 First, the court noted that Missouri courts of appeals have held that
police reports are "reports of an official action," and are, therefore, generally
within the scope of the fair report privilege. 44 Next, without explanation, the
court stated that "the welfare and possible abduction of a child is a matter of
' 45
public interest." 1
With these decisions made, the only remaining concern for the court was
whether the news report was a "fair and accurate" account of the police
reports. 46
' The court stated that a police pick-up order and missing person report
supported the station's report that police were looking for the plaintiffs

Kenney's defamation claim as well as the application of the privilege, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals focused its decision solely on the application of the fair report
privilege. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 923-24 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1976)).
141. Id. at 924 (citing Englezos v. Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 32
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
142. Id. (citing Shafer v. Lamar Broad. Co., 621 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Erickson v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 797 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990), Biermann v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 627 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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granddaughter.'47 The court then noted that a box on the missing person report
indicated that the police believed the missing girl had been abducted by a relative
and that notes on an investigative report stated that the girl had last been seen
with the plaintiff. 4 8 Also, the court stated that the notes on the investigative
report provided that the girl's mother believed the girl was with the plaintiff and
the girl's father at an "undisclosed location."'4 9 Taking all of these facts
together, the court found that the news report stating that the plaintiff was
suspected of kidnaping her granddaughter was "at least a fair abridgement of the
information contained in the official police documents."' Therefore, the court
held that the defendant's newscast was protected by the fair report privilege.'
V. COMMENT
In Kenney v. ScrippsHowardBroadcastingCo.,"' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit erroneously and needlessly applied Missouri's
fair report privilege against defamation and, in doing so, extended the privilege
beyond its justification. The court specifically held that the fair report privilege
applied to protect Kansas City television station KSHB-channel 41 ("KSHB")
from defamation liability for reporting in an evening newscast that the plaintiff
was suspected of kidnaping her granddaughter.'
The court applied the
privilege based on its conclusions that (1) the police reports KSHB relied on for
its story were "reports of an official action," (2) the welfare of children is a
"matter of public interest," and (3) KSHB's report was a "fair and accurate"
account of the police reports."' In making these decisions, the court correctly
identified the three requirements that must be met for the fair report privilege to
apply, but, in at least two instances, the court incorrectly found that the facts of
the case satisfied the requirements.
The court's finding that police reports are "reports of official action," and,
therefore, a report based on police reports may be protected by the fair report
privilege, is debatable but probably correct. According to Missouri law, "official
action" includes "any action taken by any officer or agency of the government
of the United States, or of any State or of any of its subdivisions."' 55 It seems

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. 259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001).
153. Id. at 924.
154. Id.
155. Shafer v. Lamar Publ'g Co., Inc., 621 S.W.2d 709, 712 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. d (1976)).
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readily apparent that a city's police force is an agency of the government of a
state or its subdivisions. So, it would seem reasonable to assume that any action
taken by the police should be considered "official action." This assumption,
15 6
however, is not completely supported by the comments to the Restatement.
The comments specifically provide that statements made by police that are not
yet a part of an arrest are not to be considered "official action."'5 7 Under this
limiting language, because the police reports KSHB relied on to make their news
report were merely investigatory in nature and not connected to any arrest, the
police reports could not be considered "official action" under the Restatement.
Still, the limiting language of the Restatement is probably not a part of
Missouri's fair report privilege analysis, and the preliminary police reports relied
on by KSHB are probably correctly considered "official action" under Missouri
law. No Missouri court has ever adopted, or even considered, the language of
the Restatement that limits police action that may be considered "official action"
to action actually related to an arrest.5 8 In fact, several Missouri courts have had
no problem finding that actions taken, or statements made, by police prior to or
completely unrelated to an arrest were "official action" and within the scope of
the fair report privilege.5 9 So, because Missouri has adopted a broad definition
of what action may be considered "official action," and has completely ignored
the limiting language of the Restatement, it appears consistent with Missouri law
to find that the police reports relied on by KSHB were "official action."
The Kenney court's finding that child welfare is a "matter of public
interest," and that KSHB's report of the possible abduction of plaintiff's
granddaughter, therefore, satisfied Missouri's fair report privilege requirement
that reports be a matter of "public concern," is on much shakier ground. In
making this conclusion, the court simply stated, as a matter of fact, that "the
welfare and possible abduction of a child is a matter of public interest."' 60 This
idea has some support in the case law of Missouri.' 6 ' In Klein v. Victor, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri stated that "child
abuse.., is a matter of public concern," but in reaching this decision the district
court, just like the Kenney court, provided no explanation or limitation
62
concerning its statement.
There is no argument that in some respects both the Kenney and Klein court
are correct. The welfare of children, possible child abduction, and child abuse
156. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. h (1976).
158. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

159. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
160. Kenney v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 259 F.3d 922, 924 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001).
161. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
162. Klein v. Victor, 903 F.Supp. 1327,1331 (E.D. Mo. 1995); see supranote 122
and accompanying text.
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are certainly important societal concerns. At some point and in some
circumstances, however, these broad societal concerns become so individualized
and personal that they cannot fairly be considered to be a "public concern." An
example or two will make this point more clearly. Suppose that a local school
district is considering changing its graduation requirements. In this situation,
each member of the community that comprises the school district would
undoubtedly have an interest in the possible changes. This interest can be stated
in broad terms as a public concern in the education of children. So, broadly
stated, the education of children is a "matter of public concern." Now, suppose
that Emma Clark, a student in the school district, is in danger of failing her
Algebra class. This problem clearly falls within the broad category of "the
education of children," but almost no one would think that whether Emma
studies as much as she should or is doing all of her Algebra homework each
night is a "matter of public concern." Most people would unquestionably see
Emma's problem as a private concern to be dealt with by Emma, her teacher, and
Sara and Matt Clark, her parents.
Similarly, most people would agree that infant healthcare, as a broad
concept, is a matter of public concern. Still, if Emma Clark, now an infant,
becomes jaundiced, it seems absurd to think that the precise amount of time that
Sara and Matt Clark place Emma under bilirubin lights every day could be
considered a matter of public concern.'63 Even though this situation clearly falls
into the category of infant healthcare, an admitted "matter of public concern," the
circumstances have become so personal and individualized that this precise
situation is no longer a matter of public concern.
The same reasoning applies to the facts of the Kenney case. In Kenney, the
court makes the unquestionably accurate broad statement that "the welfare and
possible abduction of a child is a matter of public interest."' 64 Under the specific
facts of the case, however, the circumstances are so private and individualized
that the precise location of the plaintiff's granddaughter could not be rightfully
considered a matter of public interest. According to the facts as recited by the
court, the "missing" girl's parents had never been married and had no custody
order or agreement dictating which parent had what kind of parental rights. 6 '
When the girl was not returned to the mother as the mother had expected, she
was not worried that some stranger had taken her daughter. Rather, everything
she told to the police and KSHB indicated that she believed her daughter was

163. Inextreme cases of neglect, Sara and Matt could be civilly or criminally liable,
but only in these cases, and perhaps not even then, could their individual health care
decisions regarding their child be considered a matter of concern for the public at large.
164. Kenney, 259 F.3d at 924.
165. Id. at 923. The mother and father had a court date to finally establish an
official custody arrangement for the Tuesday after the weekend in which the girl was
reported missing. Id.
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with the girl's father.'66 In fact, the girl's mother received a phone call from the
father in which he stated that he had their daughter.'67 So, the possible
"abduction" was actually a simple dispute over which parent should have
custody of the girl until a custody agreement was established. This kind of
parental dispute is a personal matter to be worked out by the parents and those
people, such as the police officers and the plaintiff, the parties specifically seek
out for help. This is true even though the situation falls into the broad category
of "child welfare" or "child abduction." Where the plaintiff's granddaughter
spent the night in question is of no interest to anyone else in the community, and
the information contained in the police report and subsequent news report,
therefore, was not a "matter of public concern." Because of this, Missouri's fair
report privilege should not have applied to protect KSHB from defamation
liability.
Even if the contents of the police reports KSHB relied on for its news report
were a matter of public concern, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit incorrectly found that KSHB's report was a "fair and accurate"
account of the contents of the police reports. Under Missouri law, a report of an
official action related to a matter of public concern must be a "fair and accurate"
account of the official action to be entitled to the protection of the fair report
privilege.' 68 In making its decision that KSHB had satisfied this "fair and
accurate" requirement, the Kenney court stated that KSHB's news report was "at
least a fair abridgement of the information contained in the official police
documents."' 69 This statement correctly recognizes that the "fair and accurate"
requirement does not demand an exact replication of the information contained
in an official action or proceeding.'
Still, a report must be "substantially
correct" in the sense that it does not add anything not contained in the official
action or proceeding and does not present a report in a manner that conveys a
misleading impression about the contents of an official action or proceeding.' 7'
If KSHB's news report had actually been a fair abridgement of the
information contained in the police reports as the court suggested it was, it would
have been a "fair and accurate" account of the police reports. KSHB's report,
however, went beyond the information that was contained in the report, and in
addition, presented the information contained in the police reports in an unfair
manner. During KSHB's report, it stated that "[f]amily members believe the
girl's father and grandmother are now with her at an unknown location."'7 Yet,

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
See supranotes 123-36 and accompanying text.
Kenney, 259 F.3d 922 at 924.
See supranote 124 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 124-26 and accompanying text.
Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.
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nowhere in the police reports did it state that anyone, family members or
otherwise, believed that the girl was presently with her grandmother. The police
reports did state that the plaintiff grandmother was the last person to be seen with
the girl,' 73 but this hardly justifies the jump in logic that the plaintiff would still
be with the girl, especially when the police reports explicitly noted that the girl
was believed to be with her father.' 74 So, by stating that family members
believed the girl was currently with the plaintiff, KSHB's news report went
beyond the information contained in the police reports, and, because of this, it
was not an "accurate" account of the police reports.
KSHB's report was also not a "fair" account of the police reports. The
"fair" portion of the "fair and accurate" requirement of the fair report privilege
is violated if a story is presented in such a way as to mislead an audience about
the contents of an official action or report.'75 During KSHB's report, it displayed
a picture of the "missing" girl and a picture of the plaintiff.'
This directly
suggests that the plaintiff was the prime suspect in the girl's abduction. This was
simply not the case as it was presented in the police documents. According to
the documents, it is obvious that the police believed the father was primarily
responsible for the girl's disappearance. 17 Yet, KSHB chose to display a picture
of the plaintiff and not the father. By doing this, the news station distorted the
information that was actually contained in the police reports and provided its
audience with a misleading impression of the contents of the police reports. This
distortion necessarily means that the report was not a "fair" account of the police
reports. Because of this, and also because the news report provided information
that was not contained in the police reports, the news report was not a "fair and
accurate" account of the police reports. KSHB, therefore, should not have been
given the protection of the fair report privilege, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit erroneously applied Missouri's fair report
privilege to the case.
The Kenney court not only incorrectly applied Missouri's fair report
privilege to protect KSHB from defamation liability, but they also applied the
privilege to a case that could have easily been dismissed without the use of the
privilege. The court could have dismissed the case because the plaintiff had

173. Id. at 923-24; see supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. The facts of the
case suggest that the plaintiff's husband told police he believed the plaintiff was currently
with the missing girl, but this was never reflected in the police reports. Kenney, 259 F.3d
at 923. In one of the final sentences of the court's opinion, the court states that a note on
the investigative report indicated that the girl's mother believed the girl was with the
plaintiff. Id. at 924. This point, however, which would seem to be key to the case, was
never made by the court below, or even by the instant court in its recitation of the facts.
174. Id. at 923.
175. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
176. Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.
177. Id.
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failed to plead the elements required for a prima facie defamation claim. To
make a valid defamation claim under Missouri law a plaintiff must show that the
defendant (1) published (2) a defamatory statement (3) of and concerning the
plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault,
and (6) that damages the plaintiffs reputation.'7 8
According to the facts of the case, KSHB's news report clearly satisfies the
first three elements. First, KSHB broadcast its report to the entire Kansas City
viewing area, easily satisfying the "publication" requirement. Second, the
statement that police and family members believed that the plaintiff played some
role in abducting her granddaughter is necessarily the kind of statement that
would lower her "in the estimation of the community and deter third persons
from associating with" her. Because this is all that must be shown to prove that
a statement is defamatory,' 79 the plaintiff's accusation based on KSHB's news
report satisfies the second element of defamation. Third, because KSHB's news
report specifically named the plaintiff and showed her picture, there is no
question that the statements contained in the report were "of and concerning" the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff failed, however, to satisfactorily prove the three remaining
elements. To satisfy the "falsity" element, the plaintiff is required to prove that
the defamatory statement was a "false statement of fact."' 80 To meet this
requirement the plaintiff must show that the defamatory statement was a
statement of fact and that it was false.' 8' In the Kenney case, the precise
defamatory statement at issue was KSHB's statement that family members
believed the plaintiff was with the missing girl.'82 This statement is provable as
false in that it is either true or not true that family members believed that the
plaintiff was with the missing girl. The statement, therefore, is a statement of
fact. From the facts of the case, however, it does not appear that the statement
was false. Both the missing girl's mother and the plaintiffs husband told the
police that they believed the plaintiff was with the missing girl. 3 So, the
statement that family members believed the missing girl was with the plaintiff
was true, and because of this, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the falsity element of
a defamation claim.
Similarly, the plaintiff did not, and could not have, satisfied the "level of
fault" element of a defamation claim. Under Missouri law, a plaintiff in a

178. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000); see
Englezos v. Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998);
MISSOURI APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, § 23.06(1) (6th ed. 2002); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1976).
179. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

18 1. See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
182. Kenney, 259 F.3d at 923.

183. Id.
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defamation action who is not a public figure must prove that the defendant made
a defamatory statement with negligence as to the truth of the statement. 8 4 As
already stated, the plaintiff could not prove that KSHB's allegedly defamatory
statement was false, and because of this, she would have no way of showing that
KSHB was negligent as to the truth of the statement. So, the plaintiff could not
have satisfied the "level of fault" element of a defamation claim as required by
Missouri law.
Finally, the plaintiff had not satisfied the sixth element of a defamation
action. This element requires a plaintiff to prove that her reputation is damaged
in some way beyond mere ridicule.'85 At the lower court, the plaintiff readily
admitted that she had not suffered any damage to her reputation as a result of
KSHB's story.' 86 This admission made it impossible for the plaintiff to contend
that she could satisfy the final element of a defamation action, and as a result, she
failed to state a prima facie case of defamation against KSHB.
By incorrectly and needlessly applying Missouri's fair report privilege, the
Kenney court extended the privilege beyond its justification and provided an
example of the dangers of applying a defamation privilege beyond the
circumstances that justify the privilege. The primary justification for the fair
report privilege is that it serves the public's interest in receiving information
concerning matters of public concem.' 87 The goal is allowing the public to enjoy
greater freedom of expression and greater ability to have the government respond
to the public's will.' 88 This justification was not served by KSHB's report. As
stated previously, the issue of which parent the plaintiffs granddaughter was
with at the time she was reported missing was a matter of private, rather than
public, concern, and the public had no justifiable interest in the information
contained in the news report.' 89 The Kansas City community gained no greater
ability to control their government as a result of receiving information regarding
the girl's mother's claim of abduction, and learning of the police activities
concerning the girl in no way encouraged the kind of freedom of discussion the
privilege was meant to encourage.

184. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000); see supra
note 93 and accompanying text. The plaintiff was a private figure because she fits neither
of the two possible ways in which a person may be considered a public figure. See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
185. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
186. Kenney v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., No. 98-1079-CV-W-BD, 2000 WL
33173915, at *5 (W.D. Mo. June 28, 2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001).
187. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
189. Although the news report added a request for help at the end of the story, the
main thrust of the story seems to have been the mere fact that the girl was missing and
that family members believed she was with her father and grandmother. See Kenney v.
Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 259 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2001).
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By stretching the requirements of Missouri's fair report privilege to apply
to a case where the justification for the privilege would not be served, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit laid the groundwork for continued
misapplication of the privilege to future cases in which the justification will be
just as obviously missing. The court's application of the privilege may not seem
like that great of a concern because it would almost certainly have reached the
same result if it had simply made its ruling based on the merits of the plaintiff's
claim. Nevertheless, because the court forced the privilege to fit in a case in
which it had no proper application, the court has loosened the requirements of
the privilege and created a precedent by which the privilege may be applied in
future cases where a plaintiff does, in fact, have a valid defamation claim.
Thereby, the Kenney court may have prevented future plaintiffs from recovering,
even though they may have suffered real harm to their reputations, and even
though, under the circumstances, the public's interest in freedom of expression
is not furthered in any meaningful way by the application of the fair report
privilege.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Kenney decision incorrectly applied Missouri's fair report privilege to
a case that did not warrant or need the protection of the privilege. In doing so,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expanded the fair
report privilege beyond the justification that gave rise to the privilege in the first
place. This decision makes it more difficult for future Missourians to recover for
actual harm to their reputation suffered as a result of a defamatory statement
without providing any measurable benefit to the public of Missouri.
STEVE J. JASPER
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